We are delighted to announce that we have been appointed as a Value Added Partner by CGE Risk, the leading provider of barrier-based risk management solutions.

We have been using the bowtie methodology for several years with railway, metro, tram, fire & rescue and social care clients, so this appointment marks an important stage in how we help clients apply the technique.

Being a Value Added Partner for CGE Risk allows us to provide a complete solution for the bowtie risk assessment methodology; helping you to understand and apply the methodology and also provide and implement CGE’s specialist software for producing excellent bowties.
CGE Risk has verified that we have been trained in risk and incident analysis methods as well as the application of these in their software solutions.

If you are looking for consultancy (applying the bow tie technique to your business risks), training in the methodology and/or the software or advice on how to scope or purchase software then please contact us.
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On the 9 November 2016, a tram on the Croydon tramway network overturned at Sandilands. The tram had been travelling at 73 km/h when it entererd a curve that had a maximum speed limit of 20 km/h. The speed caused the tram to overturn as it passed through the curve, and resulted in passengers being thrown around inside the tram, with some being ejected through broken windows. Of the 69 passengers involved in the accident, seven died and 61 were injured; 19 seriously.
The Rail Accident Investigation Branch's report has been released today and makes some far-reaching recommendations for the way tram operations in the UK are regulated and managed. Sadly, many of the recommendations are made about things that are already known about (and managed) in the rail sector, but which were not applied to tramway operations - tramways are often regarded as being more akin to road operations than rail operations. The accident at Sandilands makes it clear that rail sector engineering standards and management systems (for example fatigue management) are highly relevant to tram operations.
The investigation report concludes that it is probable that the tram driver temporarily lost awareness on a section of route on which his workload was low. A possible explanation for this loss of awareness was that the driver had a microsleep, and that this was linked to fatigue. Exacerbating this was that there were few landmarks so that the driver was unable to quickly reorient himself.
The report makes 15 recommendations to improve tramway safety. Some apply to the operator of the Croydon tram network (First Group), but many apply across  all UK tram operations:

• creating a dedicated safety body for UK tramways 
  
• reviewing how UK tramways are regulated
  
• introducing automatic braking and driver vigilance systems to trams (some tramways already have vigilance systems)
• developing a better understanding of the risks of tramway operations, particularly when the tramway is not on a road
• improving the strength of tram doors and windows
• improving safety management systems, particularly encouraging a culture in which everyone feels able to report their own mistakes
• improving the tram operator’s safety management arrangements.